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PHYSICS AND RELIGION
AN INTRODUCTION ABOUT RELEVANCE AND NEUTRALITY1
I. POSITIONS ON "SCIENCE AND RELIGION"
1. A brief history of relevance and separation
Superfidally the history of the relation between science and religion might
be structured as follows. In the Middle Ages religion and prescientific knowledge
were integrated. The rise of modern science led to conflicts. This resulted in
modern atheism as well as in religion withdrawing from the cognitive domain to
apparently inaccessible realms such as ethics or feelings. This story will be
sketched and nuanccd here (I.I). The issue then seems to be in what way religion
may have a chance again in the cognitive realm (section 2), or whether it should
develop more in line with the insights which resulted in separation (section 3).
a. The medieval synthesis
A synthesis of religious convictions and (pre-)scientific insight seems to
characterize the late Middle Ages. Prominent among the scientific insights were
those of Aristotle, as mediated through Arabic culture. A major example of
a theological system in coherence with the available knowledge was the work of
Thomas Aquinas (13th century). However, the synthetic approach was not
restricted to systematic theology. Fiction, like Dante's trilogy about heaven, hell,
and purgatory illustrates the medieval quest for a worldview as well. Ideas taken
from the Greek philosophers (Aristotle, Plato), from Holy Scripture and from the
writings of the Church Fathers (e.g. Augustine [4th and 5th century]) were
integrated.
Among the characteristics of the medieval synthesis were its static character,
its hierarchical structure and geocentrism. The order, built upon Aristotle's
1
 Presented in Tarnów on 1 May 1992.
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doctrine of "natural place" was not understood as something merely factual; the
order was also prescriptive. (As some uses of the word "natural" or "counter-
natural" in our time still reflect). The order of the world was not something
accidental, but reflected God's order and providence.
b. The rise of the modern sciences and the Galileo affair:
relevance or neutrality?
Though some elements in the old synthesis were lost with the rise of modern
science, especially its geocentrism (and thus its Aristotelian doctrine of "natural
place"), at first most scientist argued more or less the same with respect to
religion. The order of the world as science discovered it, was the order God had
put into it. One could learn about God from the book of Scripture and from the
book of Nature. It is misunderstanding that the beginning of modern science was
marked by conflicts between science and religion, or between scientists and the
Church. To make clear that the situation has been more complex, let me make
a brief digression on the Galileo affair.2
The conflict that arose in the seventeenth century around Galileo has often
been seen as a conflict between science and the Catholic Church, or even theology
in general. However, the conflict reflected a conflict between two views of, and
social contexts for, science. There was the scholastic tradition, appealing to
previous authorities (Aristotle as The Philosopher') well established in the
medieval universities. The new sciences arose in another setting, in combination
with the trade and crafts in the cities which were gaining in importance. Whereas
the then traditional approach equated knowledge and certainty, the new ap-
proach led to modern empirical science, ascribing a more provisional and
probabilistic status to knowledge. The Galileo conflict may be seen as marked by
a specific alliance between the medieval, scholastic tradition in knowledge and
certain powerful elements in the Catholic church rather than as a straightforward
conflict between conservative religion and progressive science.
The Galileo affair may also be described as a conflict between two views of
religion, especially of the relevance of Scripture for science. In Galileo's writings,
especially in his Letter to Grand Duchess Christina (1615), two types of argument
about the proper way of dealing with the relation between Scripture and natural
science can be found.
2
 The analysis of Galileo's use of Scripture (for which he appeals to Augustine) follows E.
McMullin (1981). The socio-political element is more expounded by De Santillana (1955). Alliances
may have been different from what we expect: "a major part of the Church intellectuals were on the
side of Galileo" (XII). The conflict "reveals Galileo, like all free men, seeking support in established
custom, credit, and tradition, while Urban VIII , like all organizers of power, becomes the unwitting
tool of the streamlined, the 'efficient', and the new" (ibid., DC). Emphasis on substance, rather than
power, is placed by J. J. Langford, who also discusses the two ways of dealing with Scripture (1966,
e.g. 65ff).
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Relevance. Firstly, if science has proven certain facts, one has to
adapt one's interpretation of Scripture. However, if scientific knowledge is
merely "plausible opinion and probable conjecture" in place of a sure and
demonstrated knowledge, one would have to give priority to Scripture:
"where human reasoning cannot reach — and where consequently we can
have no science but only opinion and faith — it is necessary in piety to
comply absolutely with the strict sense of Scripture". Thus, the information
of Scripture is relevant to our view of the world and vice versa, but
Scripture or science needs reinterpretation if a conflict arises. Which one
needs reinterpretation depends on the certainty of the claims made by both
sides. By the way, science may be open to reinterpretation in two ways.
The substance itself may be interpreted differently. But the status of
scientific statements may also be assessed differently. For example,
Copernicus' book De Revolutionibus Orbitun Caelestium (1543) had an
anonymous preface (now known to have been from the Lutheran
theologian Osiander) which emphasized that these ideas were no more than
hypotheses, developed for simplifying calculations, and did not aspire to be
true.
Neutrality. Secondly, however, Galileo also argues for the neutrality of
Scripture in matters cosmological, and vice versa. The goal of Scripture was not
to inform us "how the heavens go", but "how to go to heavens". The Bible is
only relevant in matters "which concern salvation and the establishment of our
Faith".
„Relevance" and "neutrality" are not consistent with each other. However,
both lines are similar to contemporary positions, as described in sections
2 („Relevance") and section 3 („Neutrality"). Similar to the division between
relevance and neutrality is the division between expansion and restriction. One
could either argue for a restricted scope of science and of religion, thus
allowing for their coexistence and mutual neutrality, or one could argue that
they cover more or less the same issue (everything?), which implies relevance
of the one for the other, either negatively (conflict) or positively (harmony).
c. Three attitudes
Over the centuries, following the rise of modern science, various positions
developed, of which some assume "relevance", whereas take off from
"neutrality".
Relevance: an antagonistic attitude, which defended the old view of the
world, despite scientific discoveries proving the opposite. Such conflicts
continue until our time, with "creationism" being its most well known
contemporary manifestation. The reverse of this antagonistic attitude,
rejecting science for religious reason, is the rejection of religion as
a consequence of scientific discoveries. Characteristic titles in this context
8 WILLEM B. DREES
have been A.D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in
Christendom (1896) and J.W. Draper, History of the Conflict betweenReligion
and Science (1875). However, as a balanced view of history, this "warfare"
model is far from the whole story.
Relevance: an adaptive and integrative attitude, taking up the new
discoveries and arguing for the meaningfulness of religion in terms offered
by the sciences. This may be exemplified by the English "arguments from
design" tradition. If one were to find a complex item on the shore, and it
turned out that that item could be interpreted as indicating the position of
the Sun (a watch), it would be well defensible to argue that the item was
designed for that purpose, rather than that the correlation was a mere
accident. Similarly, so the argument goes, should one opt for intentional
design of organisms, as their intricacy surpasses by far the intricacy of
watches.
A separation of religion and science. The idea that religious convictions
are neutral with respect to scientific ideas has continued to attract major
thinkers over the centuries. One well known example is the philosopher Immanuel
Kant, who discussed in his Kritik der r einen Vernunft (1781) the status and
limitations of theoretical, scientific knowledge, whereas he introduced religion
(God, soul, immortality) in the context of his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
(1788), his major work on ethics. The theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher
(c. 1800) placed the feeling of absolute dependence at the core of religious
life, thus incorporating the neutrality principle.
By the way, though much contemporary discussions focus more on the
results of science, the emphasis on feeling or attitudes may also be a meeting
ground for science and faith. For instance, the historian of science Olaf Pedersen
has argued that, "when a scientist realizes the implications for one's personal
existence of the fundamental scientific experience, he has adopted a relationship
towards the world which is essentially the same as that which the believer adopts
when expressing belief in creation" (Pedersen 1988, 138). Science does not
disclose God's attributes. Rather, science and faith have to do with similar
attitudes towards the world, say the feeling of joy and satisfaction at making
contact with the reality, with relational structures for which we are not
responsible though we may be able to recognize them as that reality which has
been given to us.
As a more recent form of neutrality one might mention the philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in his later writings emphasized that the meaning of
words is to be understood through their use. Thus, the meaning of the term
"goal" may be clear in the context of football, but it is unintelligible in the
context of chess. Various practices constitute various language games.
Transferring concepts from one language game to another language game, say
from religion to theoretical physics or vice versa, is considered as a misguided
enterprise.
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d. The rise of atheism
Concurrent with the development of the three positions mentioned above
there is the rise of modern atheism.3 This has often been linked to the rise of
science, though the development of historical consciousness (and its application
to religious tradition) has been a major factor as well.
The rise of atheism is not only a consequence of conflict between
science and theology (antagonism) or of the retreat of theology into some
inaccessible realm (separation). The defense of Christianity became based on
philosophical argument or on evidence from the world. It seems to go
without notice that specific religious elements were left out. One "will look
in vain for the history of holiness as a perpetual manifestation of mystery,
the testimony of the mystics, the depth of human religious practice over
thousands of years, and — even more remarkable for a Christian culture —
anything of the reality and meaning of Jesus of Nazareth. Religion either in
its internal, intuitive, affective dimensions or its historical, institutional,
external, traditional dimensions has nothing to offer to the question"
(Buckley 1988, 94). Thus, the issue is also what the, mostly implicit, criteria
are by which it is determined what would count as evidence. Turning to
philosophy, and subsequently to physics, in search for a foundation for
religious convictions may have been a betrayal of religion itself. "The origin
of atheism in the intellectual culture of the West lies thus within the
self-alienation of religion itself' (Buckley 1987, 363).
However, this is only one perspective on the history of science-and-religion.
Whereas this perspective traces the problem of linking religion to the science
of the day (seeking too much relevance), the historian Max Wildiers argues
that the loss of plausibility for religion has risen as a consequence of the
separation of religion and modern science, discovering insights which did not
fit into the medieval worldview assumed in theology. Again, as in the preceding
section, whereas one author emphasizes distinctiveness, another assumes the
mutual relevance of science and religion.
3
 It should be stressed that atheism is a term which is relative to theism, and often used for those
who defend a different view of the divine rather than its non-existence. Akhenaton was accused of
atheism when he introduced the worship of a single god in ancient Egypt, and Socrates was charged of
atheism when he questioned beliefs about gods in ancient Greece. A discussion may be found in
Buckley (1987, 1-36). He notes two influential books against "the atheists", by Leonard Lessius and
Marin Mersenne, which appeared in the beginning of the seventeenth century. They brushed together
various thinkers under this label. „Like witches, atheists were discerned everywhere, refuted, run to
the earth, and put to death. The only problem is, it is not certain that they existed" (Buckley 1988,91).
The archetypal, selfconscious modern atheist seems to have emerged in the middle of the eighteenth
century in France, for instance Baron Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach, author of Système de la
Nature, ou des Lois du monde physique et du monde moral (1770), and Denis Diderot, the chief editor of
the Encyclopédie.
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2. Ideas, knowledge and valuation : fundamental decisions
It is too easy to suggest that it is only the substance of knowledge regarding
the world that separates us from the medieval synthesis. There are at least four
different types of change that should be considered in reflection on the
(ir)relevance of contemporary physics for theology.
Changes in substance of our ideas about the world are obvious. Most
significant have been the loss of geocentrism, the longer time scales, and the
evolutionary understanding of humanity in relation to the rest of the living world.
Changes in our view of knowledge have occurred as well. The subject
acquired a more prominent place. In Descartes' famous phrase Cogito ergo sum,
I think therefore I am, certainty was not located in the world outside him, as
everything could be an illusion. Certainty was found in the reflection upon the
process of thinking. The philosopher Kant understood the world as it is in itself,
to be inaccessible; the accessible world is the world as we describe it in our
categories. These categories, for instance Euclidean space, were thought to be
necessarily the way they were. Though subsequent developments have shown this
necessity to be mistaken, the insight still stands that knowledge is shaped by our
categories and not just by the reality it intends to be about. The turn to the
subject with his or her categories of thought is continued in our century with
emphasis on the role of language and context. How much is our knowledge about
the world (realism) and to what extent is it our construction, relevant in
a specified practical context but not to be granted a more universal meaning aside
of that context?
A third issue regards our appreciation of the world. The medieval synthesis
took it for granted that the world reflected a divine order. Some continued this
affirmative line, even if the order of nature itself was seen differently. As the poet
Pope wrote for Newton's grave: "Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night. God
said, Let Newton be, and all was light". However, others felt that with the loss of
the traditional order of the universe, all sense of order — whether natural or
social — was crumbling down. An example is provided by a fragment of a poem
by John Donne (1611; discussed by Toulmin 1990, 93-103).
And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
The Element of fire is quit put out;
The Sun is lost, an th'earth, and no mans wit
Can well direct him where to look for it.
And freely men confess that this world's spent,
When in the Planets, and the Firmament
They seek so many new; they see that this
Is crumbles out again to his Atomies.
Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinks he has got
To be a Phoenix, and that what he can bee
None of that kind, of which he is, but he.
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Remarkable to us may seem the feeling that with the loss of the
astronomical order the social order — the just relation of father and son,
of prince and subject — is gone as well. A clear example of change in
appreciation of the world may be the cultural impact of the earthquake
that destroyed Lissabon in 1775. The French philosopher Voltaire wrote
a Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne (1756). In Voltaire's book Candide ou
l'Optimisme (1759) thé philosopher Pangloss keeps defending that this is the
best of all possible worlds. The location of the nose is an example of
divine providence, as well as the fact that the need for glasses suggests
a lack of divine providence. The more Pangloss argues his case, the less it
becomes con vincible.
Whereas the medieval synthesis affirmed the world as God's good creation,
the present perception allows more for meaninglessness and ambivalence,
among the spectrum of valuations of the world.
Changes in our understanding of religion may be related to all three
developments mentioned above.
Firstly, some have attempted to adapt contemporary theology to the
substantial changes in our view of the world. Creation is no longer
understood as a once and for all event, but rather as a continuous process.
Adaptation to the contents of our contemporary insights about the world has
its problems. We are evolutionary adapted to think in terms closely
connected with common sense experiences: "the sun rises" rather than "the
Earth turns". Similarly, we are prone to imagining concepts like "heaven" as
"above", even if it is hard to maintain that there is a throne on the clouds
in a time of worldwide travel by air. As students and teachers of physics
experience regularly, it is not easy to free ourselves from the categories of
thinking which were fruitful dealing with the meso-level of reality that was
relevant to survival in the evolutionary development of the human species.
Many persons experience changes in our way of conceiving of reality as an
unnerving loss, even though some attempt to develop new images.
Secondly, theology has responded to the emphasis on the human role
in knowledge, for example by withdrawing to "feeling" (Schleiermacher), by
taking up Kant's transcendental argumentations about the conditions for the
possibility of knowledge or of ethics in a religious context, by turning to
the subjective and personal (e.g. Martin Buber's "I — thou" in contrast
with "I — it"), or by focusing on religious language of tradition.
Thirdly, the change in the appreciation of the world has affected theology.
This is most explicit in the views of those theologians that have moved from
an understanding of God in metaphysical terms, say as the Ground of Being,
to an understanding of God as being on the side of the victims, the poor,
etc. The "Death of God" discussion of the nineteen-sixties has something
to do with the stronger emphasis on human autonomy both in knowledge
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(the previous point) and in responsibility, as well as with a strong sense
of the reality of horror, of injustice in the world.4
Thus, various authors writing on science-and-religion may easily talk past
each other, even though they seem to address the same issues. Underlying
decisions shape the way the dialogue is presented. We will discuss examples of the
contemporary scene in two clusters. Are physics and theology engaged in
a common quest for understanding aiming at cognitive harmony (II)? If the
different roles of science and religion are emphasized, the shape of the interaction
of science and religion will be different (III).
II. RELEVANCE : A COMMON COGNITIVE PROJECT?
The cognitive relevance of science for religion may be clustered around
three issues: God, meaning and mystery. How might one think about God in
relation to the Universe (1)? Is there an ultimate meaning to human existence in
the Universe (2)? Is mystery a persistent ground for religious wonder (3)?
1. God
Empirical science arose, according to A.N. Whitehead (1926), when God
was conceived of as endowed with "the personal energy of Jehovah and with the
rationality of a Greek philosopher". The properties of the world could not have
been deduced by thought alone (the Greek strand), but neither could they be
taken to be purely whimsical, without regularities, totally dependent upon the
mood of some deity. Upon such a view of the rise of modern science, science and
belief in God were allies rather than enemies. One could question this view of the
history of science by pointing to other factors, like the development of
technology. However, the themes contingency and rationality still show up in
various guises in discussions about relevance of science for theology. "Design" as
the most qualitative notion in this context may be related to specific intentions of
the supreme being, like its love for humans and its longing for a free response.
What kind of God? "The most miraculous thing is happening. The
physicists are getting down to the nitty-gritty, they've really just about pared
things down to the ultimate details, and the last thing they ever expected to
happen is happening. God is showing through. (...) Mr. Kohler, What kind of
God is showing through, exactly?"5
As in the quoted dialogue, it may be relevant to ask "what kind of God" is
brought forward in the context of a cognitive dialogue between science and
religion.
4
 This underlies also the rejection of a theoretical theodicy by Surin (18%), who proposes that
one should rather focus on a practical theodicy. Thus, one should ask what we as God's creatures do
to overcome evil and suffering rather than whether the existence of an omnipotent and loving God
and the Amount of evil and suffering are compatible.
5
 J. U p d i k e , Roger's Version, New York 1989, p. 9.
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Firstly, there is the deistic idea that the main focus is on the creator,
understood as the originator, of reality. "God's is thought of as cosmic
watchmaker, the engineer who constructed it and lit the fuse, the initial
source." Carl Sagan wrote in his preface to Stephen Hawking's Brief History
of Time that the consequence of Hawking's theory, if Hawking is right, is
that there is no absolute beginning of reality, and therefore no need for
a creator: "the conclusion of the effort, at least so far: a universe with no
edge in space, no beginning or end in time, and nothing for a Creator to
do" (Sagan in Hawking 1988, X). A similar notion of God seems to be the
aim of the argument that purport to show that there was an absolute
beginning, inexplicable within the Universe, which suggests a cause beyond
the Universe.
Secondly, one might discern a more platonizing strand, thinking God
after the realm of ideas. A recent example of such platoniozing tendencies
among theoretical physicists is Roger Penrose, who defended in his The
Emperor's New Mind the reality of a timeless realm of mathematical truths,
without explicitly relating it to religious concepts. And Paul Davies plunges
into these issues in his The Mind of God upon discussing the existence of
the Universe, which might be traced to the laws of nature, which forces
one into a discussion about the relation between mathematics and reality.
Thirdly, one might consider a theistic concept of God which has God
both as the highest (transcendent, timeless) being and as the original
creator. A third element is that God is understood to be active in time,
either in human history or in the whole course of evolution (creatio
continua). This position is not easy, since it attempts to embrace the
preceding concepts which are difficult in themselves, as well as hard to
combine with each other and with the third element. That active presence
of God in history may be mitigated by reinterpreting it in a more
platonizing or deistic way. However, some attempt to maintain a place for
such a specific divine action in the (apparent)? openness of natural
processes, for example in complex systems or in the context of quantum
uncertainty.
Fourthly, one might think of a pantheistic understanding, which opts
for an ontological identity of God and the world, rather than the more
dualistic conceptions mentioned before. "God" language may, for example,
be apt to express the world as far as it is not expressible in the language
of science. We will return to such views below ((3), on mystery).
„God" is not the central concept of all contemporary religious thought.
"Meaning" is a replacement which seems quite useful in contemporary secular
western culture, either as a replacement or as a more neutral term, making the
business of theologians palatable in a wider culture as it is less suggestive of
anything supernatural. The focus on "meaning will be central to the following
section.
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2. Meaning : human existence in the universe
Order out of Chaos by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers has as the title in
the original French edition La Nouvelle Alliance : Métamorphose de la Science
(1979). The claim is that there is a new alliance between man and nature, due to
changes in science. The classical (Newtonian) physical sciences used to think of
reality in a way which declared human experiences to be illusions (for example the
experience of the passing of time). Human existence was itself a marginal side
product of the evolutionary process of mutation and selection. But changes in
science are believed to have paved the way for a new view of the meaningful place
of humanity in natural reality. Unlike the covenant of Moses at Mount Sinai, this
one is not primarily related to a God who transcends reality, but rooted in
physical reality itself. Humanity is no longer a stranger in a mechanistic world.
Rather, within the Universe there is a tendency towards higher complexity and
order, a counter-agency against degradation, according to the Belgian
philosopher of religion Van der Veken (1990, 94). Thus, he titles hid book
A cosmos for living rather than speaking of "a universe". Various ideas that go
under the name of "holism", eclectically linking physics with elements from
eastern religious stand within a similar search for meaning.
In the section on the historical background of these discussions, the distance
between us and the medieval synthesis was attributed to three factors: changes in
the content of knowledge, changes in our ideas regarding the nature of
knowledge, and changes in appreciation of the world. Here it is argued that
changes in the content have reopened the way for a new synthesis with a positive
appreciation of the world, thus overcoming the first and the third factor.
Reflections on God (preceding section) tend to be less interested in the
appreciation of the world and more in thinking through the possibility of
something beyond nature and the way that may act upon natural reality.
Reflections which give a prominent place to questions regarding the meaning of
human existence, tend to ask about harmonious correlations between human
nature and physical reality. This clearly stands within "relevance" approach of
science for religion.
When Nobel prize winner Prigogine and his co-author Stengers claimed
a "new covenant", they responded to Nobel prize winner Jacques Monod whose
influential book Chance and Necessity ended with the following sobering (or
liberating?) thought.
The ancient covenant is in pieces; man at last knows that he is alone in the
unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by chance.
Neither his destiny nor his duty have been written down. The kingdom above or
the darkness below: it is for him to choose.
The kingdom above is the kingdom of knowledge, "within man, where
progressively freed both from material constraints and from the misleading
servitudes of animism, man could at least live authentically" (Monod 1971, 167).
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The "darkness below" is variety of animism, including Utopian ideologies such as
historical materialism. The ethics of knowledge is based on an ethical choice, an
axiom which humans impose on themselves. It "thereby differs from animist
ethics, which all claim to be based on the "knowledge" of immanent, religious or
"natural" laws which are supposed to impose themselves on man" (ibid. 1971,
164). Animisms fail to make the proper discrimination between judgements of
value and those of knowledge.
It is perfectly true that science attacks values. Not directly, since science is no judge of them
and must ignore them; but it subverts every one of the mythical or philosophical ontogenies
upon which the animist tradition, from the Australian aborigines to the dialectical materialists,
has based morality: values, dudes, prohibitions. If he accepts this message in its full
significance, man must at last wake out of his millenary dream and discover his total solitude,
his fundamental isolation. He must realize that, like a gypsy, he lives on the boundary of an
alien world; a world which is deaf to his music, and is indifferent to his hopes as it is to his
suffering or his crimes (Monod 1971, 160).
Whereas Prigogine and Van der Veken may be seen to argue for the close
ties between humanity and the cosmic processes, Monod describes humanity as
a cosmic oddity, arisen by accident. Meaning is not found in that process, which
is described by science, but rather in a more existentialistic mood in the human
choice for objectivity. Objectivity as an ethical axiom cannot itself be based upon
some scientific objective basis. It is this ethical axiom which bars science from
becoming a basis for further values.
The ethical controversy between Monod and thinkers like Prigogine seems
to be whether the aim of morality and of science should be to integrate or to
question for the sake of truth and morality.
A paradigmatic quote from the physical sciences has become the words of
another Nobel prize winner, Steven Weinberg at the close of his The First Three
Minutes (1977), an introduction to modern cosmology. He describes himself
writing in an airplane, looking down upon Earth which looks mild and friendly in
an overwhelmingly hostile Universe. Reflecting on the far future of incredible
cold or unbearable heat, he concludes that "the more the Universe is
comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless". He mitigates his conclusion
somewhat in his final sentence, where he suggests that the effort to understand the
universe is one of the very few things that lifts human life a little above the level of
farce, and gives it some of the grace of tragedy. His perspective on the far future
has been challenged by Dyson and Tipler. However, it still seems to be the
dominant perspective within the context of astrophysical cosmology.
The merits of various proposals deserve, of course, more detailed discussion
than can be given here. I want to conclude by suggesting an intermediate position,
between meaninglessness and meaningfulness of the Universe. The Canadian
astronomer Hubert Reeves refers to the myth of Prometheus when he discusses
the development of nuclear weapons. An unprecedented capability for
destruction is based on an impressive amount of knowledge. We are placed in
a border zone, between good and evil. The development of complexity, life,
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consciousness and intelligence in the course of cosmic evolution is ambivalent.
Meaning is something we may create, rather than detect. Life is accompanied by
doubt and uncertainties. Whether uncertainty could be seen as another common
ground where science and theology could meet, will be discussed in the next
section.
3. Mystery : a common awareness of not-knowing?
Robert Jastrow concluded his God and the Astronomers with the following
image. For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason,
the story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance;
he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final
rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there
for centuries (Jastrow 1980, 125).
The essence of modern cosmology is, according to Jastrow, that the
Universe "began at a certain moment of time, and under circumstances that
seem to make it impossible — not just now, but ever — to find out what
force or forces brought the world into being at the moment" (1980, 12).
Theology always lived with awareness of its inability to express what God
is. This section will not deal with the cosmological issue; Jastrow's specific
example might be in need of modification due to quantum cosmological research.
The issue here is the emphasis on the limits of human knowledge. Is there
a common meeting ground for religion and science in not-knowing?
One of the Ten Commandments in the Jewish and Christian heritage is
the prohibition against worshipping idols, as such a practice is considered
religiously and socially destructive. The Greek heritage developed a more
metaphysical and epistemological critique of anthropomorphic concepts of
God, as the origin of knowledge and existence is itself beyond knowledge.
Later systematic thought distinguished between two ways of considering
God's attributes. The first way is one of extrapolation and affirmation. We
know to a certain extent what power, presence, and wisdom mean. God is
thought of as omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. The other approach
is labelled the via negativo: we deny features of reality in reflecting
upon God. Stating that God is a-temporal is not a positive statement about
God's nature, but a denial of temporality. "God is infinite" is not
a cognitive statement, as if one claimed to know what "infinite" meant, but
a denial of creaturely finitude. Sallic McFague in her book on Metaphorical
Theology emphasizes that we should respect the "isnot" character of
metaphors, especially in religion, as they save us from absolutizing images
and falling into idolatry. That would result in a loss of sensitivity for the
symbolic nature of religious language. Thus, recognition of God as the
unknowable, as a mystery at the heart of religion, seems well rooted in
religious thought.
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Does science leave room for mystery? Some clarification of the scope
of the term "Universe" as the domain of science may be helpful. And are
there any reasons within science to assume that there is a mystery about
which we cannot speak scientifically? At least four questions seem open for
discussion regarding such ideas, two in relation to science and two in relation
to the religious use of the ideas.
a. Mystery and science
One item for the discussion is the claim that science suggests unknowable or
veiled reality within the context of the known. This is strongly linked with
discussions regarding scientific realism, especially if realism is taken to mean that
science is progressively approximating the correct theory, with theoretical terms
in that genuine theory genuinely corresponding to the aspects of the reality
outside the theory.
Besides, one should not merely consider what we do not know (which might
be knowable or unknowable), but also that which we know negatively. Ideas
previously held to be true, or probable, have been shown to be wrong, or at least
probably wrong. Science may well be used to critique ideas about that reality.
This could be liberating, as it creates room for new ideas.
b. Mystery and religion
If the kind of "veiled reality" (D'Espagnat) or "Boundless existence"
(Munitz) is taken seriously, one still may wonder what its significance for religion
can be. Is it merely an expression of our cognitive limitations, and the recognition
of unknowable or partly knowable aspects of reality? Is that sufficient to inspire
religious awe? Or does religious mystery presuppose ceratin qualities about that
mysterious reality, which might make associations with love, trust or beauty
justified? It is not clear to me how such a transition of categories is to be made in
the context of these approaches.
Besides, there may well be a strong hesitancy in theological circles to make
too much of these apparent mysterious aspects. The methodological catch word is
the "God-of-the-gaps". It has happened that gaps in a scientific account, whether
an account of the evolution of the human out of earlier mammals, or of complex
physical phenomena, were seen as possible loci of special divine intervention.
Such an approach disregards the coherence of the scientific account, and is well in
danger of resulting in a religious position which is always on the retreat as science
successively fills such gaps. Are there gaps which do not erode? Are these
mysteries of Munitz and D'Espagnat persistent? Or will there be a future theory
beyond quantum physics which lends itself much better to an interpretation of
reality in a single scheme of objective reality, without the distinction between
veiled and empirical reality? One might connect this back to the earlier discussion
about contingency: is there any contingency that will be inaccessible to science?
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Are the laws of nature possible candidates, or might they be necessary? And what
about the existence of something rather than nothing?
c. Mystery of existence
Relative to a framework in which we exist the Universe necessarily exists —
but such a necessity has a. post faction character. Relative to a framework which
allows for nothingness, an "outside" or "beyond" with respect to anything in the
Universe, the contingency of existence seems unassailable. I have for a long time
considered this to be a stop-gap, a last resort for the theologian if there is nothing
else to claim, the "God of the ultimate gap". I still doubt whether this
contingency of existence is useful in a cosmological argument for the existence of
God. It seems equally well possible to accept the Universe as a brute fact, which
just happens to be. But nonetheless, this contingency is related to a sense of
wonder. It has been described aptly by the physicist Charles Miser, who wrote:
'To say that God created the Universe does not explain either God or the
Universe, but it keeps our consciousness alive to the mysteries of awesome that
we might otherwise ignore" (Misncr 1977, 95).
To understand the Universe as a gift, as grace, is a way to interpret this
sense of amazement and to relate it to an understanding of God.
III. NON-COGNITIVE RELIGION AND SCIENCE
The preceding discussions about God, meaning and mystery assumed the
significance of cognitive elements in religion. However, as we saw, in the
introduction, for example, in the context of the Galileo case, there have been
serious thinkers, both scientists and theologians, who opted for a mutual
neutrality. Religion is important as it deals with other aspects of human existence,
rather than supplementing scientific explanations with some metaphysics.
However, as will be argued below, this does not imply that there is no need for
a dialogue with the natural sciences. However, other questions may become more
central.
1. Ethics
A dialogue between science and religion could focus on the ethical issues
due to science and technology. Medical ethics is a great business; the physicists,
chemists and biologists have their issues as well, among which nuclear weapons,
environmental pollution and genetic engineering have attracted much public
attention.
Besides, one might reflect on the economical ethics involved: what moral
considerations are involved in spending so much money in science? Which science
would be justified? Science needs a cultural support which values the search for
knowledge, even if it is not profitable in a direct sense. Otherwise, astrophysics
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and cosmology might well be suspended. It is not amazing that people working
on the American Superconducting Supercollider become nervous when nearing
presidential elections place domestic social issues high on the public agenda in the
USA.
It may be questioned whether such ethical issues are within the province of
religion. Not only science has emancipated itself from religion in modern times,
but ethics and politics as well. In a liberal society, which Western societies
basically are, various religious traditions co-exist under a large umbrella of
allegiance to public laws and procedures as well as to general set of human rights
and human values. Religion has lost its grip on the public realm, but also on the
private realm, where increasing numbers of people tend to base their choices on
their own preferences or decisions rather than on allegiance to some religiously
prescribed set of behavioral codes. Thus, ethics is not obviously the province of
religion anymore.
This is not the place to deal in detail with substantial normative issues,
say in medical ethics. However, it is, in my opinion, difficult to claim a special
normative contribution from religion. The contribution of religion could be,
perhaps, at a deeper level, as it asks after the underlying existential attitude.
For example, in discussing medical ethics one comes across views regarding
human finitude and death. Are we willing to accept finitude, or is it an
evil to be fought at all costs? And how do "life" and "quality of life" count?
Thus, from ethics one enters into a more existential type of questions.
Besides, our view of human nature is relevant to ethics. We will turn to that in the
next section.
2. Anthropology
What is the "place" of values in a world of facts? Are they absolute? Do
they exist in some platonic realm? Or are they evolutionary products which
achieved an apparent absolute status while actually being social codes used to
enhance survival chances for one's group in the competition with other groups of
hominids?
Does "free will" fit into scientific descriptions? Can it be caught in the
language of chance and necessity, of determination and randomness? If not, is the
experience of free choice real or illusion?
What drives humans? Is apparently idealistic or altruistic behaviour real or
inspired by a search for social status which ultimately benefits one's genes? What
is the neuro-biology of hate, love, fear, guilt and the like?
What may we expect? Is there any ultimate basis for hope and trust, or are
these human terms which function in a social context?
This seems to be a natural domain for religion, as "the religious
symbols out of which it [theology] works embrace within themselves both
the is and the ought and also an expression of how the two are unified"
(Hefner 1981, 58).
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In the dialogue with physics, it may seem as if the natural sciences
leave ample room for fundamental humanistic concerns. However, in biology
it encroaches more on these aspects of the human. Scientific approaches to
issues like free will and moral judgements tend to be functionalist ic,
practice-related. The functionalism of evolutionary explanations may be seen
as suggesting a cynical view of morality. Whereas sociobiology tends to such
a functionalistic approach, physics might be brought in for a more ontological
reflection — say about determinism or a platonic realm of values.
The whole complex of problems arises due to the expansive character of
science. It seems as if there are no boundaries to scientific enquiry. It expands its
territory from relatively simple systems such as balls rolling down slopes to
complex systems, such as the human brain. The expansion goes hand in hand
with the critical role of science with respect to common sense views, which are
apparently revealed to be adequate illusions. Whereas we tend to think of space
as flat (Euclidean), relativity theories have criticized that. Whereas we consider
a table to be solid, quantum theories offer a rather different view of substance.
The gap between "the two cultures" is a philosophical one about the status that
should be granted to human experience and practice as articulated at the
meso-level of common sense.
One more remark concerns the apparent reductionistic tendency of such
approaches. However, it may be defended that these approaches stem "from the
'holistic' recognition that there is no fundamental barrier between our biological
nature and our cultural and historical life" (Eaves and Gross 1990, 16). Others
have spoken of "well-winnowed wisdom" that is embodied in our biological make
up. Hence, religion and morality may, perhaps, be seen in that context, but that
does not exclude that there is relevant wisdom in them. This may be reflected
upon in diachronic (evolutionary) accounts as well as in synchronie accounts
(genetics and neurophysiology).
A role for physics aside of biology? At a conference on Wolfhart
Pannenberg's Anthropology in Theological Perspective (1985), he was questioned
by Lindon Eaves (1989) on the absence of biological perspectives in his discussion
of human nature. The answer by Pannenberg was that he slicked to
thermodynamics, e.g. the work of Prigogine and others on open systems,
when he wished to discuss life, whereas he turned to anthropologies of a more
philosophical nature when discussing the distinctively human.
The move to physics in reflecting on free will has been defended by
others as well. Quantum theories, thermodynamics, chaos theories, and the
like are appealed to. An example is the work of John Polkinghorne,
a professor of theoretical physics, who has become an anglican priest. He
seeks to identify a basis for human freedom and mind as well as for divine
action in the world.
„Chaotic dynamics would represent the first primitive stirring of openness
as one mounted the ladder of complexity leading from matter to mind. (...)
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Agency through the holistic operation of information within the intrinsic
flexibility of complex physical systems, might also be a way of understanding
God's action in the world".6
He is interested in openness both towards the future and for structuring
influences with aside of any bottom-up account. However, concepts like freedom,
determinism and predictability are more problematic than Polkinghorne seems to
acknowledge. For example, Barman (1984) gives a detailed analysis of the
meaning of determinism in different contexts. Determinism is, according to his
treatment, not identical with a state at tx causing a state at t2, and certainly not
necessarily so in a future direction, nor should it be confused with (unpredict-
ability. It is not even dependent upon the notion of a flow of time, contrary to
Polkinghorne, who argues that "chaos theory's intimation of openness" implies
a flow of time, the future not being there waiting for us.
Freedom is linked with holistic properties, more or less as self-
determination. However, I see two dangers. On the one hand, the emphasis on
unpredictability and the like, the physical side of the alleged openness if seen from
bottom-up, makes it hard to see a conscious or intentional decision as a form of
selfdetermination, as the openness persists at all levels. What makes a "self' into
a unit that is not again characterized so much as openness, room for manoeuvre,
but is a principle of selection? Is there not a shift in category involved? On the
other hand, the emphasis on the top-down causation or emergence may also
restrict genuine human freedom as self-determination by invoking larger systems
(culture, sociological determinism). What is the self that determines?
Such approaches are dependent on the physical theories involved, and their
interpretations. Quantum physics allows for various interpretations, some of
which are explicitly deterministic (like the Many Worlds Interpretation).
Contemporary chaos theory is deterministic. Thus, Polkinghorne distances
himself from chaos theory by moving from "determinism" -I- "unpredictability"
to "ontological openness" + "unpredictability". This move is made for
philosophical rather than for physical reasons.
Aside of the eclectic use and interpretation of these theories, could one not
see the amazing feature of the study of such self-organizing systems in the fact
that they exhibit behaviour as if they were guided by an external organizing
principle, but that they behaviour turns out to be explainable without invoking
any such actor — whether a life force or an Informator. As such, chaos theory
seems to be more extension of the bottom-up program to complex systems than
suggesting the existence of some "top" or "self from which proceeds
"intentional causation" downwards.
" From an unpublished paper delivered to the conference on Quantum Creation and the Laws of
Nature at Castel Gandolfo, Sept. 1991, to be published in a book edited by R J. Russell, N. Murphy
and C.J. Isham, early 1993, probably by Vatican Observatory Press and University of Notre Dame
Press. See also Polkinghorne's books (1986, 1989, 1991) which argue along the same lines.
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Anyhow, the use of contemporary physics in arguments regarding
determinism, free will and self-determination is not easy. I have the strong
impression that some of the problems arise due to the implicit lap from physical
discourse to the discourse of the humanities. The intermediate levels of biological
reality enriches the conceptuality both with respect to the person and the
environment in such a way that might well change discussion. Using physics while
avoiding the confrontation with geneticists and the like seems a rather arbitrary
eclectic approach. However, the reverse is a question worth pondering by those
that dismiss physics as a contributor to the issue. Can one think about free will
without allowing for various possible outcomes, and hence an ontology which
allows for various possibilities in connection with actuality? Or is a fully
deterministic view, with no local contingencies left, acceptable?
3. Personal note
My interest in religion started with the line related to this chapter: religion is
relevant in contemporary culture because it does other things than science, not
merely extending the scientific explanation with a metaphysical one (as in chapter
2). The tension between what is and what should be, is central to my
understanding of religion. In that context, I am interested in promoting
awareness of the limitations of the natural sciences, as to leave room for values,
for free will, for meaningfulness or at least the challenge to create meaningfulness.
This line od thought might be linked with the prophetical strand in the Christian
tradition.
Only emphasizing the tension, the absence of God, the need to change the
world, to promote the good and fight evil, is disappointing. What would one give
the power to do so? The Christian tradition has another strand — which may
perhaps be labelled mystical — of affirmation, of being aware of the presence of
God. In modern terms that might be expressed as a sense of basic trust or
meaning. I cannot localize that in the sense of a heaven above or a Kingdom in
the future. Nor can I prove trust to be deserved. Why would one trust reality?
Nonetheless, I appreciate it that the Christian heritage is characterized by both
affirmation and tension. The affirmative strand has more connections to the
questions discussed in chapter 2 above.
Some have avoided the problematic combination of these two strands. One
way is to separate the two. Marcion (2d century) may be a paradigmatic example,
separating the good God, father of Jesus Christ, the point of orientation, from the
more ambivelent God the Creator. Another way is to deny the tension, as is
characteristic of much "new age holism". If one takes the right point of view,
reality is whole. For example, Fritjof Capra, labels in The Turning Point all our
critical situations a "crisis of perception". However, the reality of evil and
suffering is too significant to make this option plausible to me. A third way would
be to deny the affirmative strand, any universal basis beyond the way humans
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deal with each other in close family networks or among friends. That might be
a stoic attitude, and I sympathize with it. However, I have already stated my
interest in maintaining the affirmative line in combination with the exhortative
line. Thus, I am interested in the items discussed in section Π — especially II.3,
the room for wonder, and the intriguing issues of intelligibility and order and
existence discussed in Π.Ι. However, I am impressed by the scientific approaches
to human nature and human culture, which seem to me to underline again the
philosophical point that religion is a significant human product. There seems to
be a fundamental circularity, in that the religious ideas developed in us and by us
speak about a reality which is supposed to carry us, including our own ideas. The
image is that of Christopher, who carried a child across a river, not knowing that
the child was Christ, carrying the word (including Christopher). We cannot avoid
our own limitations in knowing reality, nor can we avoid our own, responsibility
in acting, but we nonetheless might attempt to know and act upon the assumption
that we are carried by something — power, mystery, love? — far beyond us.
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FIZYKA I RELIGIA
WPROWADZENIE DOTYCZACE ZNACZENIA I NEUTRALNOSCI
Streszczenie
Autor prezentuje szerokie spektrum stanowisk w kwestü znaczenia wiedzy naukowej dla wiary
religijnej. Po krótkim przegladzie historycznym (sredniowiecztna synteza, powstanie nauk
przyrodniczych), autor szerzej przedstawia trzy stanowiska: nauka ma aegaiwne znaczenie dla religii,
nauka ma pozytywne znaczenie dla religii, religia winna bye odseparowana od nauki. W konteksdc
tych stanowisk zostaty przedstawione zrodia nowozyinego ateizmu. Czy religiç i naukç iaczy
perspektywa poznawcza? Poznanie Boga, sens zycia i Wszechswiata, poczuäe tajemnic.y z jedncj
strony i ograniczenia nauki z drugiej — to tematy, które mozna dyskutowac w tej perspektywie. Ale
religia ma równiez aspekty nie zwiazane bezposrednio z poznaniem: problemy etyczne i niektóre
problemy dotyczace cztowieka, protetyczna funkcja religii... Istnieja stanowiska, które akcentuj$ te
aspekty religii. Autor sympatyzuje z tymi stanowiskami, ale sadzi, ze i tych aspektow religii nie mozna
odpowiedzialnie dyskutowac z pommieciem naukowego kontekstu.
(K.1. M. Heller)
